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This article considers the effect of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on supply-chain trade 
for 64 economies in the period 2002–2011. We employ a structural gravity equation to 
estimate the impact of trade-cost reducing measures—notably infrastructural improvements 
and the creation of free trade agreements—on supply-chain trade and welfare in general 
equilibrium. We find that infrastructural investments will yield asymmetric benefits to 
China, Russia and Southeast Asian countries stemming from greater European market 
access. Our results also suggest that China’s alternatives to foster (inter)regional economic 
growth through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership offer much less attractive economic prospects.
Keywords: China, Belt and Road Initiative, free trade agreements, infrastructure, gravity model, 
trade predictions
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Introduction
In 2013, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
launched an ambitious project now known as 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Being 
President Xi’s signature foreign policy, its 
purpose is to establish modern trade routes 
spanning from China throughout Eurasia 
and the Indian Ocean akin to the ancient 
Silk Road.
From an economic perspective, the BRI 
is grounded in China’s central role in the 
world’s economy as assembler-producer 
of manufactured goods. Combined with its 
domestic overcapacity, China seeks to use 
the BRI to provide both the labour and 
capital required to construct the necessary 
infrastructure, such as high-speed railroads, 
harbours, and oil and gas (Chen, 2018, 44–45). 
The BRI is envisioned to stimulate economic 
cooperation, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and international trade among all the 
participating countries.
A key question is if, and by how much, BRI’s 
tentative infrastructural developments and 
trade policies will affect the world economy 
in light of alternatives, such as the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP). Therefore, the purpose of this article 
is to provide a quantitative assessment of the 
BRI’s effects on global trade—particularly for 
China, the European Union (EU), Russia and 
Asian countries that the PRC views as countries 












To the best of our knowledge, only a 
few articles have studied BRI’s effect on 
international trade. These articles rely on the 
gravity equation of international trade to 
measure the impact of particular BRI-inspired 
free trade agreements (FTAs) on gross trade 
flows for China and a limited number of partner 
countries in partial equilibrium. This article 
seeks to make at least two contributions.
First, we employ a state-of-the-art structural 
gravity equation à la Yotov et  al. (2016) and 
Anderson et  al. (2018), to calculate the trade 
and welfare effects of BRI on a large number 
of countries in general equilibrium. In doing 
so, we acknowledge that BRI will change trade 
costs not only for countries directly involved 
in BRI (that is, partial equilibrium), but that 
this will also indirectly alter relative trade costs 
and trade vis-à-vis excluded countries. Our 
general equilibrium results fully incorporate all 
direct and indirect effects of our counterfactual 
trade policy shocks on trade costs, production 
and trade, which paints a more complete and 
theory-consistent picture of BRI’s economic 
impact on the world economy.
Second, this article is the first to estimate BRI’s 
effects on trade in global value chains, rather 
than gross exports. By now, a large literature 
has documented the drawbacks of using gross 
trade flows to understand the structure of 
the world economy in, which production is 
globally fragmented (for example, Johnson and 
Noguera, 2012; Koopman et al., 2014; Timmer 
et al., 2014). That is, conventional trade statistics 
relay the total value of internationally traded 
intermediate goods and not only the economic 
value that was added in the most recent stage 
of the production (or assembly) process. The 
literature has shown that analyses based on 
gross trade data yield severely biased results 
that do not properly account for backward and 
forward linkages in China’s global value chains. 
To shed more light on the consequences of BRI 
for modern international trade, we therefore 
draw on the OECD’s Trade in Value-Added 
(TiVA) dataset and the World Input-Output 
Database for measures of supply-chain trade. 
In particular, we compare and contrast our 
outcomes in terms of different measures of 
value-added exports recently proposed by Los 
and Timmer (2018).
Empirically, we will examine how trade 
costs affect general equilibrium outcomes for 
a number of scenarios. These scenarios will 
all account for different ways in which the 
BRI could reduce trade costs in (i) the high-
speed railway connecting China to Singapore 
through Laos, Thailand and Malaysia, and (ii) 
the railway connecting western China with 
Europe via Kazakstan, Russia and Belarus 
into Poland.1 Specifically, we will examine how 
BRI will affect trade outcomes when trade 
costs are reduced by means of infrastructural 
developments leading to a decrease in the 
geographic distance between countries’ 
economic centres. Alternatively, we will examine 
how the elimination of trade frictions such as 
tariffs through the creation of FTAs might be a 
relevant complement—or alternative—to BRI. 
In our analysis, we will demonstrate the relative 
importance of both channels and their effect on 
global supply-chain trade and welfare.
The structure of this article is as follows. The 
next section introduces the related literature 
on the role of infrastructure and FTAs on 
international trade, in particular, in the context 
of Asian regional integration. We then discuss 
the methodology and data, followed by a 
presentation of the empirical findings. The 
final section discusses the main results and 
concludes.
Literature
In studies of international trade, the gravity 
equation is the workhorse theoretical and 
empirical model that can be readily used to 
estimate how trade costs affect international 
trade flows between exporters and importers 
(for surveys of this extensive literature, see van 
Bergeijk and Brakman, 2010; Head and Mayer, 
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predicts that bilateral trade between countries 
increases with the exporter’s and importer’s 
economic size, and decreases with their trade 
costs. From an international trade perspective, 
the BRI essentially is an exercise aimed at 
reducing the trade costs between China and its 
partner countries.
By now, there is a vast gravity-inspired 
literature on the determinants of trade costs 
and their effect on international trade (see, in 
particular, Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; 
McCallum, 1995; Novy, 2013). For the purposes 
of this article, this discussion of the literature 
shall focus on geography and institutions—in 
particular trade policy—as the determinants of 
interest.
Geography is one of the main sources of trade 
costs, that is, countries’ spatial characteristics 
affecting their domestic and international 
transportation costs. The characteristics usually 
considered in the literature include geographic 
distance, whether countries share a common 
border and if they are either landlocked or 
island states.
Intuitively, a greater geographic distance, not 
sharing a common border and/or being more 
remote from a trade partner negatively affects 
transportation costs and therefore international 
trade. These consequences can be mitigated 
through infrastructural developments, such as 
the creation of highways, tunnels, airports and 
harbours.
Indeed, infrastructure is an important 
determinant of transportation costs (for an 
overview, see Hummels, 2007). For example, 
Limao and Venables (2001) find that poor 
infrastructure accounts for around 40% of 
coastal countries’ trade costs; this share can be 
as high as 60% if trade partners are landlocked.
A number of detailed studies provide 
insightful examples of how changes in 
infrastructure alter bilateral trade costs and 
international trade. Pascali (2017) finds that 
the introduction of the steamship in the first 
wave of globalisation changed the bilateral 
trade costs for certain exporter-importer 
pairs relative, making it possible not only to 
increase trade, but also to establish new trade 
routes independent of maritime winds. In a 
related vein, Donaldson (2018) shows how the 
development of railways throughout colonial 
India increased both intra-national and 
international trade and welfare. In contrast to 
infrastructural developments, the (temporary) 
removal of infrastructure negatively impacts 
trade and welfare, as illustrated by the closure 
of the Suez Canal in the 1970s (Feyrer, 2009). 
The literature also shows that not only the 
quantity of infrastructural connections, but also 
the quality of infrastructure is relevant for trade 
(Bougheas et al., 1999; Feyrer, 2018; Nordås and 
Piermartini, 2004).2
Trade costs and trade are also affected by 
institutions in their broadest sense. On the one 
hand, examples of persistent, time-invariant 
institutions shaping trade costs include cultural 
familiarity—for instance, in terms of a shared 
spoken language—and similar administrative 
and legal practises stemming from a shared 
colonial history (Head et  al., 2010; Ku and 
Zussman, 2010). Institutional quality, such as 
the rule of law, also hampers trade in that it 
restricts exporters’ market access to developing 
countries (Francois and Manchin, 2013).
On the other hand, trade costs are also 
affected by time-varying institutions shaped 
by trade policies. The most common examples 
include countries’ membership of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and FTAs (see, 
for example, Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Kohl, 
2014, 2017; Rose, 2004).
Specifically in terms of FTAs, there are two 
initiatives that are of particular interest to the 
PRC: (i) the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
and (ii) the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) among participants of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). There is also perhaps a third option, 
which would be to pursue signing a FTA with 
BRI-related countries rather than opting 













To facilitate the remainder of this discussion, 
it is useful to provide a brief overview of 
China’s current FTAs and the available 
options. Table 1 lists the FTAs that the PRC 
has recently announced or that it has already 
enforced.3
First is the TPP, now officially known as the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPATPP). 
Initially launched as a US-based mode of 
governance thought of as a means for the USA 
to increase its economic dominance in the 
Asian-Pacific, the explicit exclusion of China 
(and India) was intended to set a new level of 
standards for the international trade system 
which would be very difficult, if not costly, for 
China to adhere to. However, after the United 
States’ withdrawal under President Trump, 
TPP gives a new and interesting platform for 
the PRC to consider joining, as it would yield 
market access to countries with which it does 
not yet have an FTA—specifically Canada 
and Japan.
However, RCEP offers an ASEAN-led 
alternative to TPP that does include China 
and India, along with the other four countries 
which have bilateral FTAs with the ASEAN 
group, that is Australia, Japan, New Zealand 
and South Korea. The agreement has not yet 
been concluded.
Devadason (2014) analyses the potential 
for Chinese export expansion under TPP and 
under ASEAN-based alternatives (ASEAN, 
ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6, the latter being 
the same set of countries as RCEP).4 Using a 
gravity equation with gross trade flows, she 
calculated the partial equilibrium effects of 
different FTA’s representing TPP and ASEAN 
alternatives. Her results suggest that TPP would 
offer greater market potential to China than the 
ASEAN-based regional alternatives. However, 
given the unlikely outcome that China and the 
USA would converge on international product 
and investment standards under TPP, the author 
concluded that RCEP would be a more viable 
FTA for China to join in the short term whilst 
maintaining an open dialogue to consider 
joining TPP in the future.5 However, to the 
best of our knowledge, subsequent research 
has been conducted to consider either FTA 
option’s impact on supply-chain trade.
As for the BRI’s outcome on trade, the only 
relevant study seems to be recent work by 
Herrero and Xu (2017). Theirs is an interesting 
approach in which they develop new proxies 
for geographic distance from China to the 
rest of the world, depending on whether trade 
occurs by means of air, land or maritime-
based transportation. Based on their partial 
equilibrium elasticities of gross trade to these 
different measures of distance, they then 
calculate the implied effects on trade, assuming 
that BRI reduces land-based distance relatively 
more than maritime-based trade.6
The authors then consider the gains 
of implementing infrastructural BRI 
improvements without an underlying FTA, the 
gains of only having an FTA without a physical 
BRI, and a combination of both. Their results 
suggest that a reduction of travel time will mostly 
favour EU countries by 8–10%. The addition of 
an FTA would slightly reduce the EU’s gains 
from BRI. The combination of both transport 
improvements and an FTA would yield largest 
gain to Russia (11%), followed by Albania 
(10%), and Germany, Hungary and Slovakia 
(~9%). Unfortunately, the reported estimates 
are not sufficiently detailed at the country 
level to facilitate a full comparison between all 
alternatives for all countries involved in TPP, 
RCEP and/or the BRI—not even for China.
Notwithstanding the insights obtained from 
previous gravity-based studies on TPP, RCEP 
and BRI, ours is essentially different in at least 
two important ways.
The first distinctive feature is that our 
analysis acknowledges the fact that modern-
day globalisation is characterised by trade in 
value-added, rather than trade in final goods 
(see, for example Johnson, 2014; Johnson 
and Noguera, 2012; Timmer et  al., 2013, 
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literature in which value-added trade flows 
are incorporated into gravity-based analyses 
(Aichele and Heiland, 2018; Brakman et  al., 
2018; Caliendo and Parro, 2015; Johnson and 
Noguera, 2017; Kaplan et  al., 2018; Noguera, 
2012).We add to this approach an application 
of counterfactual policy analysis in the context 
of the BRI. We therefore employ data on 
Table 1. China’s FTAs.
Partner Bilateral APTA ASEAN RCEP TPP
APTA *
ASEAN *     
Australia *   * *
Bangladesh  *    
Brunei   * * *
Cambodia   * *  
Canada     *
Chile *    *
Costa Rica *     
EU      
Georgia *     
Hong Kong *     
Iceland *     
India  *  *  
Indonesia   * *  
Japan    * *
Laos  * * *  
Macao *     
Malaysia   * * *
Maldives **     
Mexico     *
Moldova **     
Myanmar   * *  
New Zealand *   * *
Norway **     
Pakistan *     
Peru *    *
Philippines   * *  
Russia      
Singapore *  * * *
South Korea * *  *  
Sri Lanka  *    
Switzerland *     
Taiwan *     
Thailand   * *  
United States     †
Vietnam   * * *
Note: * (**) indicates an enforced (announced) FTA; † indicates a country’s withdrawal from a given FTA. China has 
bilateral agreements with APTA (Asian-Pacific Trade Association), ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), 
is member of RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) and considers joining TPP (Trans Pacific 
Partnership).
Source: http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/fta_qianshu.shtml and http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicSearchByMemberResult.aspx












value-added exports—rather than traditional 
measures of gross exports—to correctly 
measure international supply-chain trade 
as our dependent variable.7 This decision is 
further motivated by China’s central role as 
one of the world’s major assemblers in global 
value chains.
The second distinguishing feature of our 
analysis is that we rely on a novel, state-of-
the-art structural gravity model that allows 
for the calculation of trade outcomes under 
specific trade policy scenarios (for an in-depth 
discussion of this literature and available 
methods, see Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 
2014). In particular, recent work by Yotov 
et  al. (2016), and Anderson et  al. (2018) 
enables researchers and policy makers to 
determine partial and general equilibrium 
changes to trade and welfare for a variety of 
trade policy changes, including the removal 
of borders, the introduction/removal of FTAs, 
and modifications to non-tariff barriers. While 
previous research on BRI presents the trade 
cost elasticities of China’s FTAs in general, 
none of these articles explore different trade 
policy scenarios related to BRI and what their 
implied effects would be for international 
trade (in valued-added) and welfare in general 
equilibrium.
The added value of our approach—closely 
following Yotov et  al. (2016) and Anderson 
et  al. (2018)—is that we compute the general 
equilibrium effects on trade in value-added 
and welfare, given a simulated change in trade 
policy, and how it affects the country pairs 
involved directly and indirectly. The direct effect 
pertains to countries that, say, have signed on to 
the BRI by signing an FTA with China. Indirect 
effects are accounted for by means of the 
so-called multilateral resistance terms (MRTs), 
that is, price indexes that control for the fact 
that trade policies change trade costs between 
countries directly involved in the policy, but 
also relatively vis-à-vis all other countries in 
the world economy (Anderson and Wincoop, 
2003; Feenstra, 2016). Our results shed further 
light on the economic outcomes of China’s bold 
initiatives to shape the world economy in the 
21st century.
Methodology and data
In gravity models, the standard interpretation 
of geographic distance is that it serves as a 
proxy for transportation costs—including 
shipping costs and the time investment 
required to ship goods from the origin to 
the destination. In the context of the present 
article, we assume that BRI’s investments in 
infrastructure will reduce transportation costs 
and therefore increase international trade—
both for countries directly involved with 
the policy as well as for countries indirectly 
affected through changes in their multilateral 
resistance terms (MRTs).
Alternatively, BRI sets out to reduce trade 
costs through the creation of FTAs. In their 
simplest form, FTAs reduce tariffs. However, 
more recent FTAs tend to be much more 
extensive by design, covering a wide variety 
of policy domains unrelated to tariffs, which 
may still serve as impediments to trade (Baier 
et al., 2018; Kohl et al., 2016). Examples of such 
policies include mutual recognition of product 
standards or even complete harmonisation of 
legislation.
Taken together, the key mechanisms through 
which we expect BRI to bring about a change 
in international trade is through either a 
change in geographic distance as a proxy for 
infrastructural investments, or the creation of 
FTAs as a substitute for such infrastructural 
developments.
Estimation with counterfactual 
scenarios
The computation of our counterfactual 
scenarios follows Anderson et al. (2018) and is 
described in the following steps (for the most 
detailed account of the procedure outlined 
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Step 1 is to estimate a baseline gravity equation,
Xodt = exp[β1lnDISTod + β2CNTGod
+ β3BRDRod + β4FTAodt + δot
+ γdt + ζod]× εodt,
 (1)
where X  is the bilateral trade flow between 
origin o and destination d  in year t, lnDIST 
is the log geographical distance between the 
pair of countries, CNTG is a binary variable 
controlling for whether or not countries in a 
dyad are contiguous, BRDR equals 1 if trade 
has to cross an international border and is 
0 if trade is intra-national, and FTA is 1 if a 
country-pair has an FTA in a given year and is 
0 otherwise. The origin-year fixed effect δot and 
destination fixed effect γdt enable us to control 
for outputs, expenditures and multilateral 
resistance terms in the context of the structural 
gravity equation, while the country-pair fixed 
effect ζod controls for time-invariant, pair-
specific characteristics that are both observable 
(that is distance, common language, contiguity) 
and unobservables (aspects of trade policy) 
that may give rise to endogeneity bias (Baier 
and Bergstrand, 2007).8
Step 2 is to calculate the trade costs and trade 
cost elasticities with respect to our key policy 




= exp[ηˆ1lnDISTod + ηˆ2CNTGod
+ ηˆ3BRDRod + ηˆ4FTAodt],
 (2)
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution 
among varieties, assumed to be constant across 
all baseline and counterfactual scenarios. tˆBSLod  
indicates the estimated baseline (BSL) trade 
costs for country-pair od .
Step 3 is the actual implementation of the 
counterfactual trade policy scenario, in which 
we change geographic distance for a set of 
countries and/or introduce an FTA.9 For 
infrastructural investments, we will provide 
estimates for three different degrees of 
improvement in transport costs. The ambitious, 
upper-bound case assumes that a 50% 
reduction in transport costs can be realised 
through BRI’s investments in infrastructure. 
Our motivation for this upper-bound estimate 
is Herrero and Xu’s (2017, 50)  report that 
travel time on the Chonqing-Duisberg line 
had been cut by half. However, the same 
authors also provide another example where 
travel time decreased from 17–18  days to 
12–13 days, that is a reduction of 30%. Finally, 
we assume that the lower-bound impact of 
BRI on transport cost reduction is 15%. So, 
in sum, we will analyse BRI’s infrastructure 
improvements in terms of them leading to a 
15%, 30% or 50% reduction in geographic 
distance.10 For FTAs, the procedure is slightly 
less involved. In this case, we simply switch 
the FTA dummy-variable “on” for country-
pairs that do not have an FTA in a given year, 
that is change the relevant FTA observations 
from 0 to 1.
Step 4 is to calculate the counterfactual 
(CFL) trade costs, given the implemented 




= exp[ηˆ1lnDISTCFLod + ηˆ2CNTGod
+ ηˆ3BRDRod + ηˆ4FTACFLod ].
 (3)
Step 5 is to solve the model so that it will yield 
either partial equilibrium, conditional general 
equilibrium or full endowment general 
equilibrium results, and to calculate their 
change with respect the baseline estimates. 
Essentially, one takes the counterfactual 
trade costs from Step 4 and predicts the 
counterfactual trade flows for the given 
level of output, expenditure and multilateral 
resistance terms, which yields outcomes 
in partial equilibrium. Note that partial 
equilibrium does not allow for MRTs to 
change, so indirect effects on countries not 
immediately involved in the counterfactual 












Fortunately, Anderson et al.’s (2018) method 
can subsequently also be used to iteratively 
obtain counterfactual multilateral resistance 
terms, which yields counterfactual trade 
outcomes for a given level of production 
and expenditure (the so-called conditional 
general equilibrium) for countries directly and 
indirectly affected by the counterfactual policy 
scenario. Finally, the model also provides the full 
endowment general equilibrium, which yields 
counterfactual trade flows, MRTs, production 
and expenditure (that is welfare).
Data
We draw on two different datasets to collect 
information on bilateral trade flows. The first 
dataset is the OECD Trade in Value-Added 
(TiVA) dataset, December 2016 release. The 
database covers 63 countries from the OECD, 
EU28, G20 and countries from Southeast Asia 
and South America and a Rest-of-the-World 
(ROW) aggregate. A  full list of countries will 
be provided with the main results, below. The 
data are available for the period 1995–2011 
(annually). This dataset yields two variables 
of interest on bilateral trade flows, namely the 
FD_VA series on the value-added content of 
final demand, by source country and industry 
(in USD million), and the GX series as gross 
exports by source country and industry (in 
USD million). We refer to the former as TiVA-
VAX and the latter as TiVA-GX.
The second dataset is based on the World 
Input-Output Database (WIOD), in particular, 
a recent release by Los and Timmer (2018). 
WIOD data cover 43 countries and a ROW 
aggregate and the period 2000–2014. Los and 
Timmer (2018) argue that recent studies of 
supply-chain trade in a gravity framework rely 
on what they call VAX-C. However, they argue 
that this measure is not entirely appropriate 
when considering the effects of bilateral policy 
measures on bilateral value-added flows. By 
construction, VAX-C does not accurately 
indicate value-added trade in bilateral settings 
and may still contain value-added trade of 
countries beyond the bilateral pair under 
consideration. Los and Timmer (2018) address 
this problem by introducing a novel measure, 
dubbed VAX-D, which they argue is suitable 
for bilateral trade flow analyses.
Given the ongoing discussion on the proper 
construction of suitable measures for bilateral 
value-added trade, we explore the sensitivity 
of our findings to by presenting all estimates 
in terms of TiVA-VAX, WIOD-VAX-C and 
WIOD-VAX-D.11
Los and Timmer (2018) provide a useful 
illustration, which we repeat here in abbreviated 
form for the purpose of the present study. 
Consider a global production chain, in which 
a good’s raw materials originate in country 
A and sequentially move through the chain as 
intermediate goods in country B and C, reaching 
country D for final assembly and country E for 
consumption. Further assume that countries 
A  through D each contribute 1 unit of value-
added. As Table 2 indicates, bilateral gross 
export statistics will count both country A  as 
well as country B’s value-added contribution 
(the so-called problem of double counting). 
Turning to value-added measures, the measure 
that has most commonly been used thus far in 
applied work is VAX-C. Bilateral VAX-C flows 
between B and E will show that country B indeed 
provided 1 unit of value-added to the product 
consumed in E. Yet for policy analyses with the 
gravity equation, there is a potential problem. 
For example, analysing the counterfactual effect 
of an FTA introduced between pair BD needs 
Table 2. Gross versus value-added exports.
From B C D
To C D E D E E
Gross exports 2 0 0 3 0 4
Domestic value-added for
... direct use (VAX-D) 1 0 0 1 0 1
... consumption (VAX-C) 0 0 1 0 1 1
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value-added measures to indicate the value of 
products exported by B directly used in D’s 
production. Note that VAX-C and VAX-D are 
identical for flows from the final assembler to 
consumer. In this situation, what matters for 
gravity analyses is that VAX avoids the problem 
of double-counting in gross export statistics.
For the sake of comparability of our 
results, and following Yotov et  al.’s (2016) 
recommendation to use interval data as opposed 
to annual data, we retain data for the years 2002, 
2005, 2008 and 2011 from both datasets. The 
selection of these years steers clear of possible 
concerns pertaining to the structure of the 
world economy under the “first” and “second” 
unbundling Baldwin (2006). 2008 data also do 
not yet reflect the effect of the financial crisis 
and the Great Trade Collapse.
TiVA-VAX provides both international and 
intra-national values for trade in value-added. 
The dataset provided by Los and Timmer 
(2018) only contains VAX-C and VAX-D 
values for international flows. Fortunately, 
we can complement these variables with 
intranational flows extracted from WIOD 
(Kaplan et al., 2018). For a detailed discussion 
of the importance of intra-national trade flows 
in structural gravity models and the related 
literature (Baier et al., 2017, 48–49).
Geographic distance and contiguity are from 
the familiar CEPII GeoDist database Mayer 
and Zignano (2011). We calculate intranational 
distances following Anderson and Yotov (2016). 
Information about countries’ participation 
in FTAs is from Kohl (2014) and the WTO’s 
Regional Trade Agreements Information 
System. By construction, BRDR is a binary 
variable which is 0 if the origin and destination 
country are identical to indicate intra-national 
trade and 1 otherwise.
Results
Southbound
We first consider the southern leg of the Belt 
Road Initiative, which is a high-speed railway 
system stretching from China to Singapore 
through Laos, Thailand and Malaysia.12 We 
consider three possible scenarios in which 
infrastructural developments allow the 
geographic distance between these countries to 
be reduced by 15%, 30% and 50%, respectively.
Figure 1 shows that the gains in trade from 
the 15% to 50% reduction in distance yields 
varying degrees of improvement in both gross 
exports and value-added trade. First, notice 
the substantial differences in the estimated 
magnitudes for Singapore’s gross exports as 
opposed to its trade in value-added. Clearly, 
decreasing trade costs would substantially 
increase gross trade for Singapore as one of 
Asia’s key trade hubs by 3–15%, depending 
on the overall decrease in distance. However, 
most of this trade is simply transit with very 
little to no value-added activities provided by 
Singapore. In contrast, the estimated increase 
in value-added trade is only about 1–3%. 
Findings for Malaysia relay a qualitatively 
similar insight that gross trade statistics 
overstate BRI’s effect on participating 
members’ economies when double-counting 
is unaccounted for. For the remainder of the 
article, we therefore refrain from using data 
on gross exports and prefer to shed more light 
on the performance of value-added trade 
measures.13
In terms of value-added exports, we find 
that Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore stand 
to gain more than China in any scenario in 
which distance is reduced. China would see its 
trade increase by a rather negligible 0.3–1.3%. 
Singapore’s value-added will rise between 0.6% 
and 2.9%, Malaysia 1% and 5.1% and Thailand 
1.2% and 6.2%. We also find evidence of welfare 
improvements for these countries, albeit very 
small (that is, at most 0.63% for Malaysia if 
distance were to decrease by 50%). Would 
opting for a BRI-inspired FTA in this region be 
of some use? Recall that all of these countries 
are already engaged in the ASEAN FTA, so that 
a BRI-initiative in southern Asia would have to 













While China already participates in trade 
agreements with countries in southern Asia, 
it does not yet have any trade agreements 
beyond its WTO commitments with respect 
to Kazakhstan, Russia or the European 
Union. Figure 2 provides an overview of 
the results when the PRC were to invest 
in distance-decreasing infrastructure 
improvements to facilitate trade with Russia 
and the EU.14 For ease of exposition, we will 
discuss the EU average, Russia and China, 
while full country-level information for trade 
and welfare is provided in Tables A2 and A3, 
respectively.
The heterogeneous outcomes for the different 
actors involved are striking. Setting differences 
between the types of value-added measures 
aside for the moment, notice that any reduction 
in distance will always be more beneficial for 
Chinese and Russian trade than for the EU. 
In terms of VAX-D estimates, Russian trade is 
expected to increase by 4–20.7% for a distance 
reduction of 15–50%, respectively. For China 
and the EU, these ranges are 3–16.6% and 
1–6%, respectively.
A likely explanation for these findings is that 
while the bulk of the EU’s supply-chain trade 
is intra-EU, rather than with China, Russia and 
China now gain improved access not only to 
each other, but to the world’s largest market. 
Translating these findings to changes in welfare, 
China and the EU would at best gain about 1%, 
and Russia 3%.
Turning to the difference between TiVA-VAX 
and WIOD outcomes, the former are somewhat 
more conservative than WIOD. One possible 
advantage of TiVA data in this regard is that 
the OECD separates Chinese processing trade 
activities from regular production activities, 
reducing aggregation biases (Koopman et  al., 
2012). Interestingly, the results with VAX-C 
and VAX-D are consistently very similar. As 
discussed above, bilateral VAX-C and VAX-D 
Figure 1. Full endowment general equilibrium effects on trade, induced by changes in distance along the BRI’s southern 
route through Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore based on TiVA-GX and TiVA-VAX. The lowest (highest) end of the whisker 











The BRI’s effect on supply-chain trade
flows will by construction be reasonably 
comparable if Chinese exports are primarily 
assembled goods (that is compare flows from 
country D to E in Table 2).
All the way
We now consider the situation that the 
BRI succeeds in implementing the key 
infrastructural developments needed for a 
cross-continental revival of the Silk Road, 
stretching from Singapore and Shanghai all 
the way to Rotterdam. The main results are 
presented in Figures 3 and 4.15
The figures essentially repeat the discussion 
of the westbound route. Moreover, a quick 
comparison of the southbound and BRI options 
reveals a substantial improvement to Southeast 
Asian nations’ gains from BRI—both in 
terms of trade and welfare—which can largely 
be ascribed to their improved geographic 
proximity to the European market. Under the 
most optimistic scenario, such access bolsters 
Malaysian trade in general equilibrium by up 
to 11.7% (compared with 5.1%), Singapore by 
6.4% (was 2.9%) and Thailand by 15.1% (was 
5.1%). These improvements are also reflected 
in improvements in these nation’s welfare 
outcomes. Unfortunately, lack of WIOD’s 
coverage of Southeast Asian economies limits 
our ability to compare results across data 
sources.
FTAs as alternatives to the BRI
Given the magnitude of our previous outcomes, 
the gains of BRI are not evenly spread across 
the geographical landscape of potential 
future participants. Given these asymmetries, 
it is not difficult to imagine that the BRI—in 
terms of infrastructural developments and 
commitments—might be a bridge too far for all 
envisioned partner countries.
An alternative strategic goal might therefore 
be to consider the possibility of a BRI-based 
FTA, that is signing an FTA between China, 
Figure 2. Full endowment general equilibrium effects on trade, induced by changes in distance along the BRI’s western route 
with Russia and the EU based on TiVA-VAX, VAX-C and VAX-D. The lowest (highest) end of the whisker represents the effect 












Russia and the EU, and China’s ASEAN-
partners in the southbound leg of the BRI. 
As discussed previously, infrastructural 
improvements and tariff reductions both are 
routes to achieving the same objective: lowering 
bilateral trade costs.
Indeed, Figure 5 confirms that the trade 
outcomes for the major countries involved 
would be positive under a BRI-inspired FTA. 
Trade would increase for China by 0.5–2.1%, 
depending on the measure used (see Tables A4 
and A5 for detailed trade and welfare estimates, 
respectively). Russia’s expected trade effects 
are now just a fraction of the infrastructural 
version, ranging between 0.27 and 0.79%. For 
the EU, the average gains are a mere 0.1–0.4%. 
Southeast Asian members included in the BRI 
can also expect marginally positive effects in 
trade, while other countries in the region can 
expect some trade diversion. To the extent that 
a comparison can be made between results 
obtained with TiVA and WIOD data, notice 
that the TiVA estimates are now the least 
conservative, while the differences between 
VAX-C and VAX-D remain relatively small.16
As a second alternative, China could join the 
negotiations on TPP to strengthen its Asian-
Pacific base and to gain improved market access 
to both American continents. Yet, our estimates 
reveal that such an outcome would actually lead 
to trade diversion for the PRC in the order of 
magnitude −0.3% to −1.1%, depending on the 
measure used. As could be expected, the effects 
of further regional integration will be noticeable 
for member countries, with no striking trade 
creation or diversion effects elsewhere. Indeed, 
Figure 6 shows that the gains of further 
integration throughout the Pacific region are 
expected to increase trade for participants 
such as Australia (0.7–2.9%), Brunei (2.2%), 
Cambodia and Korea (0.6%), Canada (1.4–
4.3%), Indonesia (0.2–1%), India (0.06–0.5%), 
Figure 3. Full endowment general equilibrium effects on trade, induced by changes in distance along the entire BRI’s route 
including the EU, Russia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore based on TiVA-VAX, VAX-C and VAX-D. The lowest (highest) 
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Figure 4. Full endowment general equilibrium effects on welfare, induced by changes in distance along the entire BRI’s route 
including the EU, Russia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore based on TiVA-VAX, VAX-C and VAX-D. The lowest (highest) 
end of the whisker represents the effect of a 15% (50%) reduction in bilateral distance and the dot marks the effect of the 30% 
reduction.
Figure 5. Full endowment general equilibrium effects for trade (white circles) and welfare (black circles) induced by a BRI-












Japan (1.1–3.5%), Malaysia (3.5%), New 
Zealand (5.3%), Peru (4.5%), Singapore (2.8%) 
and Vietnam (4.9%). Even despite its withdrawal 
from the negotiations, the USA could still 
expect a gain in trade between 0.4% and 1.5%. 
The welfare effects are smaller yet consistent 
with this pattern, with several countries gaining 
between 1% and 2%. Yet, given the anticipated 
trade diversion for China, TPP does not seem a 
fruitful avenue for the PRC to pursue.
As a final alternative, the PRC could push 
for a conclusion on the RCEP negotiations. 
However, the outcomes presented in Figure 7 
are again similar to those of TPP. China faces 
reduction in trade of −0.2% to −0.5% with more 
positive gains for member countries. In light 
of the marginal welfare losses, there also is no 
obvious incentive for the PRC to consider RCEP 
a fruitful alternative to pursuing a BRI strategy.
Overall, these results lend support to the view 
that the PRC stands to gain the most in terms 
of trade and welfare from pursuing the BRI 
through infrastructural developments leading 
to a reduction in trade costs. Such a strategy will 
yield asymmetric benefits, as improved physical 
market access to the European market would 
in particular be beneficial to BRI partners in 
Southeast Asia and Russia. In contrast, the 
benefits for EU firms are less pronounced. Yet 
compared with the gains from economically 
integrating through the negotiation of FTAs, 
our results suggest that pursuing a BRI through 
infrastructural developments aligns most 
closely with China’s economic interests.
Figure 6. Full endowment general equilibrium effects on trade (white circles) and welfare (black circles) for TPP based on 
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Discussion and conclusion
We have analysed how China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative will affect supply-chain trade under 
a variety of possible scenarios, in which the 
BRI succeeds establishing either a southbound 
corridor to Singapore, a westbound corridor 
to the European Union, or both. Using a 
structural gravity equation, we obtain novel, 
general equilibrium effects that shed light on 
the economic consequences of different parts 
of the BRI on trade and welfare. Our findings 
account for different measures of trade in value-
added, specifically VAX(-C) as is standard from 
TiVA and WIOD, along with a novel VAX-D 
measure on value-added proposed by Los and 
Timmer (2018). While we do find the expected 
differences between both major data sources, 
the differences between VAX-C and VAX-D 
are, for the purposes of this study, very similar. 
Given China’s prominence as final assembler 
in the world economy, differences in bilateral 
VAX-C and VAX-D will not yield substantially 
different outcomes when assessing alternative 
trade policy outcomes with quantitative trade 
models.
We hypothesised that BRI could lower trade 
costs, and thereby stimulate international 
trade, by either a reduction in participating 
nations’ bilateral geographic distance or 
by creating a FTA. While it is impossible at 
the time of writing to determine the precise 
reduction in transportation costs that a fully 
implemented BRI would generate, we find 
Figure 7. Full endowment general equilibrium effects on trade (white circles) and welfare (black circles) for RCEP based on 












that even a conservate reduction in distance by 
15% would in general yield more favourable 
gains from trade than the alternative of 
creating FTAs with countries along the Silk 
Road. Improved market access to the EU 
through BRI’s infrastructural improvements 
would especially favour Russia and China, 
while the EU’s gains of any BRI-related 
reduction of trade costs are relatively small. 
Combined with the EU’s recent scepticism 
about the BRI—in particular, because of the 
EU’s concern that BRI undermines its own 
geopolitical interests and disrupts the EU 
cohesion policy—Eurasian cooperation to 
bring BRI to fruition does not seem a likely 
outcome at the time of writing (Heide et al., 
2018; Mohan, 2018).17
What remains are different fora of trade 
negotiations currently underway, neither of 
which our results suggest would undermine 
China’s economic growth prospects in the Asian 
region. Our findings suggest that a BRI-inspired 
FTA would be a more suitable alternative in 
case infrastructural developments do not or 
cannot materialise. However, our results do not 
preclude the possibility that the PRC decides 
to pursue an agreement such as TPP despite 
the bleak economic forecast for the Chinese 
economy. After all, TPP might still be attractive 
from a geopolitical perspective, granting China 
an opportunity to assert greater influence in 
both American continents.
Ultimately, any final trade policy outcomes 
would be subject to a complex function of the 
political economy forces at play. The precise 
contents of these agreements will provide more 
fine-grained information for fruitful analyses 
of China’s envisioned trade policy initiatives 
to shape the world economy in the coming 
decades. In the meantime, trade policy analysts 
can prepare for such analyses by addressing a 
number of limitations in the current literature.
Absent detailed information on the 
exact policies contained in the FTAs under 
consideration, we are not yet able to account 
for potential differences in trade outcomes 
that could stem from differences in the design 
of these particular agreements. The recent 
literature has acknowledged the importance of 
the design of trade agreements and how these 
shape economic outcomes (see, for example 
Kohl et  al., 2016; Zhang and Wu, 2018). 
Armed with novel refinements to data on the 
specific contents of individual FTAs, including 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and 
investment, future research can provide rich 
analyses on the potential outcomes of China’s 
forthcoming FTAs.
Finally, distance is assumed to uniformly 
affect travel times across countries and 
across all modes of transportation. Future 
research should provide a more detailed 
understanding of how distance affects 
transportation costs and trade across various 
modes of transportation including road, rail, 
air, maritime, or any combination of these 
networks. Policies aimed at reducing trade 
costs through infrastructural developments 
may have a differential impact on transport 
cost reductions by mode of transportation. 
Moving forward, trade volumes should be 
distinguished by mode of transportation to 
determine the extent to which the quantity 
of trade changes in response to a change in 
relevant transport costs. While the relevant 
data are unfortunately not yet systematically 
available on a global and bilateral scale for a 
significant number of countries and years, data 
for the US’ trade with the European Union 
(for example BesedeŠ and Panini Murshid, 
2017) provide a fruitful avenue to pursue this 
line of inquiry.
Endnotes
1 See Chen (2018) for an overview of rail routes 
between China and Europe through Central Asia.
2 These studies go to great lengths to quantify (the 
quality of) infrastructure, which in turn alters the 
bilateral trade cost matrix and affects international 
trade. Given the uncertainty involving the exact 
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writing, we instead take a more general approach 
by directly modifying the bilateral distance (that is 
trade cost) matrix, as explained below.
3 For an insightful discussion of the political economy 
of regional trade integration in the Asian region, see 
Devadason (2014, 473–477).
4 ASEAN+3 is the core group of 10 ASEAN 
members and China, Japan and South Korea. 
ASEAN+6 extends this group to include Australia, 
New Zealand and India.
5 At the time of writing, President Obama had just 
started his second term in office and the prospect of 
a US withdrawal was not anticipated.
6 Citing available data and interviews, the authors 
argue that future railroad investments would cut 
travel time by up to 50%, while Chinese harbours 
already function at peak efficiency and further 
investments are unlikely to further speed up 
processing times. Moreover, BRI is not expected or 
assumed to  increase the carrying capacity or speed 
of container  ships or cargo aircraft. Unfortunately, 
their trade data do not account for the mode 
of transportation per trade flow, which subjects 
their obtained distance elasticities per mode of 
transportation to significant measurement bias.
7 Note that our approach differs from Caliendo and 
Parro (2015), who incorporate detailed input-output 
linkages into their gravity model. Instead, we directly 
incorporate measures of trade in value-added as 
dependent variable, acknowledging that these 
measures themselves have been constructed based 
on national input-output tables. For a discussion on 
the construction of these measures, see Timmer et al. 
(2015).
8 When performing the analyses with counterfactual 
changes in bilateral distance, note that the baseline 
gravity equation is estimated without pair fixed-
effect to obtain a baseline parameter estimate for 
distance.
9 Due to the challenges involved in solving the 
counterfactual model in a panel, we from now on 
only consider data for 2011, that is the final year of 
the panel, following Yotov et al. (2016).
10 Note that the reduction only applies to affected 
country-pairs for a given policy scenario. The actual 
distance in kilometres is multiplied by 0.85, 0.7 or 0.5, 
respectively, before taking logs.
11 Some country-level estimates are only available 
based on TiVA, given difference in the databases’ 
country coverage.
12 Note that Laos is excluded from our analyses, given 
that it is not represented in either TiVA or WIOD.
13 For a complete overview of the general equilibrium 
outcomes for trade and welfare for all countries in 
the southbound BRI route, see Table A1.
14 Kazakstan is not covered by either TiVA or WIOD 
and therefore excluded from this analysis.
15 For the sake of brevity, we do not present a separate 
table for this scenario in the Appendix, as the values 
are effectively the sums of the southbound and 
westbound scenarios. Complete tables are available 
from the author upon request.
16 A theoretical possibility is that the PRC pursues 
BRI through both infrastructural development and 
an FTA with all participating nations. For brevity 
we do not report this situation, but the results are 
essentially obtained by summing over both these 
scenarios.
17 In calculations not reported in this article for the 
sake of brevity, China and Russia could still push 
for a shorter corridor without the EU, which would 
connect China with Russia via Mongolia. However, 
the gains of this endeavour—absent access to the 
vast European market—are marginal.
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Table A1. Distance effects of southbound BRI on trade and welfare.
Country/∆Distance  Trade effects Welfare effects
TiVA-GX TiVA-VAX TiVA-GX TiVA-VAX
−15% −30% −50% −15% −30% −50% −15% −30% −50% −15% −30% −50%
CHN  0.36  0.84  1.8  0.26  0.59  1.27  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.01  0.02  0.04
HKG −0.02 −0.05 −0.1 −0.02 −0.04 −0.08  0.00  0.00 −0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00
IDN −0.04 −0.09 −0.18 −0.03 −0.06 −0.13  0.00 −0.01 −0.01  0.00  0.00 −0.01
IND −0.01 −0.03 −0.07 −0.01 −0.03 −0.07  0.00  0.00 −0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00
JPN −0.02 −0.04 −0.08 −0.01 −0.03 −0.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
KHM −0.02 −0.04 −0.09 −0.01 −0.03 −0.07 −0.01 −0.03 −0.06 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04
KOR −0.02 −0.04 −0.08 −0.01 −0.03 −0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
MYS  1.72  3.98  8.43  1.03  2.39  5.12  0.18  0.41  0.88  0.13  0.29  0.63
NZL −0.01 −0.03 −0.05 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04  0.00  0.00 −0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00
PHL −0.02 −0.04 −0.08 −0.02 −0.04 −0.08  0.00 −0.01 −0.01  0.00  0.00 −0.01
ROW −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
SGP  2.99  6.95  14.9  0.58  1.34  2.92  0.08  0.18  0.39  0.05  0.11  0.23
THA  1.45  3.36  7.15  1.24  2.89  6.18  0.16  0.36  0.79  0.11  0.26  0.57
TWN −0.02 −0.04 −0.09 −0.01 −0.03 −0.07  0.00  0.00 −0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00
VNM −0.02 −0.04 −0.09 −0.02 −0.04 −0.08  0.00 −0.01 −0.02  0.00 −0.01 −0.01
Note: Full endowment general equilibrium effects on trade and welfare for TiVA’s gross exports and value-added exports 
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Table A2. Distance effects of westbound BRI on trade.
Country/∆Distance  Trade effects
 TiVA-VAX  VAX-C  VAX-D
−15% −30% −50% −15% −30% −50% −15% −30% −50%
ARG −0.05 −0.12 −0.25
AUS −0.07 −0.16 −0.35 −0.11 −0.26 −0.57 −0.11 −0.27 −0.59
AUT  0.6  1.39  2.95  1.03  2.44  5.39  1.04  2.47  5.5
BEL  0.46  1.07  2.29  0.68  1.62  3.61  0.74  1.78  3.99
BGR  0.46  1.05  2.22  0.9  2.12  4.61  0.93  2.2  4.82
BRA −0.07 −0.16 −0.34 −0.11 −0.25 −0.55 −0.11 −0.26 −0.58
BRN −0.03 −0.07 −0.14       
CAN −0.05 −0.11 −0.23 −0.07 −0.16 −0.35 −0.07 −0.16 −0.34
CHE −0.09 −0.2 −0.43 −0.14 −0.33 −0.73 −0.17 −0.41 −0.89
CHL −0.05 −0.11 −0.24       
CHN  2.43  5.64  12.07  3.13  7.43  16.6  3.09  7.38  16.6
COL −0.06 −0.13 −0.27       
CRI −0.05 −0.11 −0.23       
CYP  0.62  1.42  2.99  1.43  3.36  7.36  1.46  3.46  7.62
CZE  0.53  1.23  2.62  0.94  2.22  4.89  1.03  2.45  5.44
DEU  0.58  1.35  2.89  0.86  2.04  4.55  0.86  2.05  4.62
DNK  0.66  1.52  3.23  1.08  2.56  5.66  1.23  2.93  6.51
ESP  0.75  1.73  3.7  1.21  2.87  6.4  1.23  2.93  6.58
EST  0.49  1.13  2.35  0.79  1.85  3.97  0.88  2.06  4.42
EU  0.61  1.42  3  1.05  2.47  5.43  1.15  2.72  6.02
FIN  1  2.3  4.83  1.59  3.73  8.12  1.79  4.2  9.15
FRA  0.68  1.58  3.38  1.05  2.5  5.58  0.99  2.36  5.31
GBR  0.73  1.69  3.62  1.02  2.42  5.39  0.97  2.31  5.18
GRC  0.84  1.94  4.12  1.53  3.62  8.01  1.53  3.63  8.07
HKG −0.07 −0.16 −0.34       
HRV −0.08 −0.18 −0.38 −0.15 −0.34 −0.75 −0.17 −0.4 −0.87
HUN  0.52  1.2  2.54  0.92  2.17  4.75  1.12  2.64  5.82
IDN −0.07 −0.16 −0.33 −0.11 −0.26 −0.58 −0.12 −0.28 −0.61
IND −0.11 −0.26 −0.55 −0.18 −0.42 −0.92 −0.2 −0.47 −1.03
IRL  0.44  1.01  2.14  0.7  1.65  3.67  1.11  2.63  5.88
ISL −0.04 −0.09 −0.2       
ISR −0.1 −0.23 −0.49       
ITA  0.84  1.94  4.13  1.39  3.3  7.36  1.4  3.34  7.48
JPN −0.1 −0.23 −0.48 −0.16 −0.37 −0.82 −0.17 −0.39 −0.87
KHM −0.03 −0.07 −0.16       
KOR −0.08 −0.18 −0.38 −0.11 −0.26 −0.58 −0.18 −0.42 −0.94
LTU  0.67  1.53  3.19  1.16  2.71  5.82  1.34  3.13  6.71
LUX  0.26  0.6  1.27  0.48  1.13  2.51  0.88  2.11  4.72
LVA  0.57  1.31  2.72  0.96  2.24  4.81  1.02  2.39  5.11
MAR −0.07 −0.16 −0.35       
MEX −0.06 −0.14 −0.3 −0.1 −0.23 −0.5 −0.11 −0.26 −0.57
MLT  0.45  1.04  2.19  1.1  2.59  5.73  1.7  4.03  8.98
MYS −0.05 −0.11 −0.23       
NLD  0.47  1.09  2.33  0.66  1.57  3.49  0.8  1.9  4.27
NOR −0.1 −0.23 −0.49 −0.15 −0.36 −0.8 −0.19 −0.45 −0.98












Country/∆Distance  Trade effects
 TiVA-VAX  VAX-C  VAX-D
−15% −30% −50% −15% −30% −50% −15% −30% −50%
PER −0.05 −0.11 −0.23       
PHL −0.07 −0.16 −0.34       
POL  0.93  2.15  4.54  1.42  3.36  7.39  1.54  3.63  8.01
PRT  0.64  1.48  3.15  1.1  2.61  5.8  1.08  2.57  5.75
ROM  0.74  1.71  3.62  1.3  3.06  6.7  1.3  3.06  6.71
ROW −0.09 −0.22 −0.46 −0.18 −0.43 −0.96 −0.21 −0.49 −1.07
RUS  3.17  7.27  15.27  3.95  9.24  20.01  4.07  9.56  20.74
SAU −0.06 −0.13 −0.28       
SGP −0.02 −0.04 −0.09       
SVK  0.45  1.04  2.2  0.77  1.82  4.01  0.81  1.91  4.23
SVN  0.4  0.93  1.98  0.77  1.81  3.98  0.77  1.82  4.03
SWE  0.8  1.84  3.9  1.38  3.25  7.15  1.48  3.49  7.7
THA −0.07 −0.16 −0.33       
TUN −0.06 −0.15 −0.31       
TUR −0.13 −0.31 −0.65 −0.22 −0.52 −1.16 −0.26 −0.61 −1.33
TWN −0.06 −0.15 −0.31 −0.1 −0.24 −0.54 −0.18 −0.42 −0.92
USA −0.1 −0.22 −0.46 −0.14 −0.34 −0.74 −0.14 −0.32 −0.7
VNM −0.07 −0.15 −0.33       
ZAF −0.07 −0.15 −0.32       
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Table A3. Distance effects of westbound BRI on welfare.
Country/∆Distance Welfare effects
TiVA-VAX VAX-C VAX-D
−15% −30% −50% −15% −30% −50% −15% −30% −50%
ARG −0.01 −0.01 −0.03
AUS  0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03
AUT  0.07  0.17  0.36  0.1  0.24  0.54  0.11  0.25  0.56
BEL  0.05  0.12  0.25  0.06  0.15  0.34  0.06  0.15  0.33
BGR  0.18  0.42  0.89  0.27  0.63  1.41  0.28  0.66  1.47
BRA  0.00 −0.01 −0.02  0.00 −0.01 −0.02  0.00 −0.01 −0.03
BRN −0.01 −0.03 −0.06       
CAN  0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04
CHE −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.01 −0.03 −0.06 −0.01 −0.03 −0.07
CHL  0.00 −0.01 −0.02       
CHN  0.07  0.17  0.36  0.11  0.26  0.59  0.11  0.27  0.62
COL −0.01 −0.01 −0.03       
CRI −0.01 −0.02 −0.05       
CYP  0.18  0.42  0.9  0.22  0.53  1.18  0.23  0.54  1.22
CZE  0.1  0.22  0.48  0.14  0.32  0.72  0.14  0.33  0.74
DEU  0.03  0.07  0.15  0.04  0.1  0.23  0.05  0.11  0.25
DNK  0.08  0.18  0.39  0.11  0.26  0.58  0.11  0.27  0.6
ESP  0.04  0.1  0.2  0.06  0.14  0.31  0.06  0.15  0.33
EST  0.31  0.72  1.53  0.41  0.96  2.13  0.44  1.05  2.33
EU  0.12  0.27  0.58  0.16  0.38  0.84  0.17  0.4  0.89
FIN  0.17  0.39  0.83  0.24  0.57  1.27  0.27  0.65  1.45
FRA  0.03  0.08  0.16  0.05  0.12  0.27  0.05  0.13  0.28
GBR  0.03  0.07  0.16  0.04  0.11  0.24  0.05  0.11  0.25
GRC  0.09  0.2  0.43  0.13  0.3  0.67  0.13  0.31  0.71
HKG  0.00 −0.01 −0.02       
HRV −0.02 −0.06 −0.12 −0.04 −0.09 −0.2 −0.05 −0.11 −0.24
HUN  0.13  0.3  0.63  0.19  0.44  0.99  0.19  0.45  1
IDN  0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04
IND −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05
IRL  0.08  0.19  0.41  0.11  0.25  0.56  0.1  0.24  0.55
ISL −0.03 −0.06 −0.13       
ISR −0.01 −0.02 −0.04       
ITA  0.04  0.08  0.18  0.05  0.12  0.27  0.05  0.13  0.29
JPN  0.00  0.00 −0.01  0.00 −0.01 −0.02  0.00 −0.01 −0.02
KHM −0.02 −0.04 −0.09       
KOR  0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03
LTU  0.28  0.64  1.36  0.38  0.9  1.99  0.42  1  2.23
LUX  0.1  0.22  0.47  0.11  0.25  0.57  0.09  0.21  0.47
LVA  0.3  0.7  1.49  0.42  0.99  2.19  0.47  1.12  2.47
MAR −0.02 −0.04 −0.08       
MEX  0.00 −0.01 −0.02  0.00 −0.01 −0.02  0.00 −0.01 −0.02
MLT  0.16  0.37  0.79  0.15  0.36  0.82  0.12  0.3  0.67
MYS −0.01 −0.01 −0.03       
NLD  0.04  0.1  0.21  0.05  0.13  0.28  0.05  0.13  0.29
NOR −0.01 −0.03 −0.07 −0.02 −0.05 −0.11 −0.03 −0.06 −0.13
NZL −0.01 −0.01 −0.03       














−15% −30% −50% −15% −30% −50% −15% −30% −50%
PHL −0.01 −0.02 −0.03       
POL  0.11  0.25  0.53  0.15  0.35  0.78  0.17  0.39  0.88
PRT  0.07  0.17  0.36  0.09  0.22  0.49  0.09  0.22  0.5
ROM  0.13  0.3  0.65  0.21  0.5  1.11  0.23  0.54  1.2
ROW −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05
RUS  0.35  0.81  1.74  0.5  1.18  2.67  0.58  1.4  3.18
SAU −0.01 −0.02 −0.04       
SGP  0.00  0.00 −0.01       
SVK  0.13  0.29  0.62  0.17  0.41  0.92  0.17  0.41  0.92
SVN  0.14  0.32  0.69  0.19  0.44  0.99  0.19  0.45  1
SWE  0.1  0.23  0.49  0.16  0.39  0.86  0.18  0.42  0.94
THA −0.01 −0.01 −0.03       
TUN −0.02 −0.05 −0.11       
TUR −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.02 −0.04 −0.1 −0.02 −0.05 −0.12
TWN  0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04
USA  0.00  0.00 −0.01  0.00 −0.01 −0.01  0.00 −0.01 −0.02
VNM −0.01 −0.03 −0.05       
ZAF −0.01 −0.01 −0.03       
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Table A4. FTA effects on trade.
Country/FTA   Trade effects
 TiVA-VAX  VAX-C  VAX-D
 BRI  TPP  RCEP  BRI  TPP  RCEP  BRI  TPP  RCEP
ARG −0.03  0.42  0.29
AUS −0.07  2.91  2.72 −0.02  1.19  1.1 −0.01  0.73  0.63
AUT  0.36  0.11  0.14  0.15  0.05  0.07  0.06  0.03  0.03
BEL  0.32  0.13  0.19  0.17  0.06  0.07  0.1  0.03  0.04
BGR  0.27  0.1  0.1  0.18  0.04  0.05  0.07  0.01  0.01
BRA −0.05  0.48  0.47 −0.02  0.16  0.21 −0.01  0.08  0.11
BRN −0.02  2.17  2.56       
CAN −0.02  4.26  0.34 −0.01  1.98  0.12 −0.01  1.44  0.07
CHE −0.05  0.21  0.24 −0.02  0.07  0.07 −0.01  0.04  0.04
CHL −0.04  5.14  0.53       
CHN  2.13 −1.09 −0.53  0.96 −0.45 −0.24  0.54 −0.3 −0.16
COL −0.03  0.55  0.28       
CRI −0.03  0.4  0.27       
CYP  0.29  0.09  0.12  0.2  0.06  0.1  0.09  0.01  0.04
CZE  0.41  0.1  0.13  0.16  0.05  0.06  0.1  0.02  0.03
DEU  0.6  0.2  0.25  0.29  0.08  0.09  0.18  0.04  0.05
DNK  0.49  0.2  0.25  0.19  0.07  0.08  0.11  0.04  0.05
ESP  0.49  0.2  0.21  0.21  0.08  0.08  0.11  0.05  0.03
EST  0.32  0.1  0.12  0.15  0.05  0.06  0.09  0.02  0.02
EU  0.39  0.14  0.18  0.19  0.06  0.07  0.1  0.03  0.03
FIN  0.6  0.21  0.31  0.3  0.08  0.11  0.19  0.05  0.06
FRA  0.64  0.23  0.27  0.27  0.08  0.1  0.15  0.04  0.05
GBR  0.66  0.33  0.4  0.25  0.12  0.13  0.13  0.08  0.07
GRC  0.52  0.15  0.25  0.29  0.07  0.13  0.13  0.01  0.05
HKG −0.07  0.53  0.74       
HRV −0.07  0.09  0.1 −0.02  0.04  0.05 −0.02  0.01  0.00
HUN  0.25  0.11  0.14  0.14  0.04  0.06  0.11  0.03  0.04
IDN −0.07  1  6.54 −0.01  0.31  2.68 −0.01  0.21  1.77
IND −0.06  0.5  6.81 −0.02  0.14  3.04 −0.01  0.06  1.99
IRL  0.24  0.12  0.15  0.09  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.03  0.03
ISL −0.05  0.18  0.2       
ISR −0.04  0.28  0.44       
ITA  0.53  0.2  0.25  0.24  0.08  0.1  0.14  0.04  0.05
JPN −0.06  3.47  3.56 −0.02  1.58  1.58 −0.01  1.06  1.02
KHM −0.08  0.63  6.07       
KOR −0.05  0.67  4.06 −0.02  0.24  1.91 −0.01  0.22  1.55
LTU  0.25  0.09  0.09  0.11  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.00
LUX  0.14  0.09  0.1  0.09  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.01
LVA  0.26  0.07  0.11  0.16  0.03  0.05  0.07  0.00  0.00
MAR −0.06  0.34  0.46       
MEX −0.02  5.2  0.31 −0.01  2.38  0.12 −0.01  1.76  0.09
MLT  0.3  0.13  0.14  0.15  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.05  0.04
MYS  0.92  3.52  4.09       
NLD  0.39  0.15  0.2  0.2  0.05  0.07  0.13  0.03  0.04












Country/FTA   Trade effects
 TiVA-VAX  VAX-C  VAX-D
 BRI  TPP  RCEP  BRI  TPP  RCEP  BRI  TPP  RCEP
NZL −0.05  5.32  5.32       
PER −0.04  4.48  0.47       
PHL −0.07  0.87  6.87       
POL  0.48  0.11  0.16  0.19  0.05  0.07  0.09  0.02  0.03
PRT  0.31  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.02  0.01
ROM  0.34  0.11  0.14  0.21  0.05  0.06  0.1  0.01  0.01
ROW −0.06  0.5  0.8 −0.03  0.32  0.46 −0.02  0.22  0.33
RUS  0.79  0.2  0.3  0.46  0.1  0.14  0.27  0.04  0.07
SAU −0.03  0.4  0.7       
SGP  0.97  2.79  3.23       
SVK  0.34  0.07  0.12  0.16  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.01  0.04
SVN  0.26  0.08  0.11  0.14  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.01  0.02
SWE  0.44  0.17  0.22  0.2  0.07  0.08  0.11  0.04  0.04
THA  1.35  0.86  5.53       
TUN −0.06  0.09  0.14       
TUR −0.07  0.21  0.34 −0.03  0.07  0.11 −0.02  0.02  0.05
TWN −0.05  0.69  0.87 −0.02  0.25  0.3 −0.01  0.24  0.28
USA −0.06  1.54  0.87 −0.02  0.62  0.27 −0.01  0.43  0.14
VNM −0.06  4.86  5.56       
ZAF −0.05  0.35  0.57       
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 TiVA-VAX  VAX-C  VAX-D
 BRI  TPP  RCEP  BRI  TPP  RCEP  BRI  TPP  RCEP
ARG  0.00 −0.02 −0.01
AUS  0.00  1.84  1.84  0.00  0.9  0.91  0.00  0.63  0.63
AUT  0.03 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00 −0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00
BEL  0.03 −0.01 −0.02  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
BGR  0.03 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00
BRA  0.00 −0.01 −0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
BRN −0.01  1.05  0.94       
CAN  0.00  1.73 −0.02  0.00  0.84 −0.01  0.00  0.58  0.00
CHE −0.01 −0.02 −0.03  0.00 −0.01 −0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00
CHL  0.00  1.6 −0.04       
CHN  0.07  0.03  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01
COL  0.00 −0.02 −0.01       
CRI  0.00 −0.04 −0.03       
CYP  0.03 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
CZE  0.05 −0.01 −0.02  0.01  0.00 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
DEU  0.04 −0.02 −0.02  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
DNK  0.04 −0.02 −0.02  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
ESP  0.03 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
EST  0.04 −0.01 −0.02  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
EU  0.03 −0.01 −0.02  0.01  0.00 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
FIN  0.04 −0.02 −0.02  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
FRA  0.03 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00
GBR  0.04 −0.02 −0.02  0.01 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
GRC  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
HKG −0.01 −0.06 −0.08       
HRV −0.01 −0.01 −0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
HUN  0.03 −0.02 −0.02  0.01  0.00 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
IDN  0.00 −0.06  1.64  0.00 −0.02  0.82  0.00 −0.01  0.57
IND  0.00 −0.02  1.75  0.00  0.00  0.87  0.00  0.00  0.61
IRL  0.05 −0.03 −0.03  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
ISL −0.01 −0.02 −0.03       
ISR  0.00 −0.02 −0.03       
ITA  0.03 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00
JPN  0.00  1.86  1.86  0.00  0.91  0.91  0.00  0.63  0.63
KHM −0.01 −0.07  1.4       
KOR  0.00 −0.06  1.61  0.00 −0.02  0.81  0.00 −0.02  0.55
LTU  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
LUX  0.05 −0.03 −0.03  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
LVA  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00
MAR  0.00 −0.02 −0.03       
MEX  0.00  1.75 −0.01  0.00  0.86  0.00  0.00  0.59  0.00
MLT  0.04 −0.02 −0.02  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01 −0.01  0.00
MYS  0.18  1.22  1.12       
NLD  0.03 −0.01 −0.02  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
NOR  0.00 −0.02 −0.02  0.00 −0.01 −0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00
















 TiVA-VAX  VAX-C  VAX-D
 BRI  TPP  RCEP  BRI  TPP  RCEP  BRI  TPP  RCEP
PER  0.00  1.72 −0.03       
PHL  0.00 −0.05  1.6       
POL  0.03 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00
PRT  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
ROM  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00
ROW  0.00 −0.04 −0.06  0.00 −0.02 −0.03  0.00 −0.02 −0.02
RUS  0.05 −0.02 −0.02  0.03 −0.01 −0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00
SAU  0.00 −0.07 −0.12       
SGP  0.23  1.2  1.11       
SVK  0.04 −0.01 −0.02  0.01  0.00 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
SVN  0.03 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
SWE  0.04 −0.02 −0.02  0.02 −0.01 −0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00
THA  0.15 −0.1  1.35       
TUN −0.01 −0.01 −0.01       
TUR  0.00 −0.01 −0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
TWN −0.01 −0.09 −0.11  0.00 −0.03 −0.03  0.00 −0.03 −0.03
USA  0.00 −0.04 −0.02  0.00 −0.01 −0.01  0.00 −0.01  0.00
VNM −0.01  1.31  1.23       
ZAF  0.00 −0.02 −0.04       
Note: Full endowment general equilibrium effects of a BRI-inspired FTA, RCEP and TPP on welfare based on TiVA-VAX, 
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